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The Influence of Charismatic Authority on Operational
Strategies and Attack Outcomes of Terrorist Groups
Abstract
Despite the historical and contemporary prevalence of charismatic terrorist leaders, there
has been very little empirical examination of the relationship between charismatic forms of
authority and the strategic operation of terrorist groups. In response to this gap in
knowledge, this study seeks to investigate if charismatic authority has a real-world impact
on strategic choices and attack outcomes of terrorist groups. Using a theoretical
framework meant to help measure charisma in terrorist organizations, this study
quantitatively examines how differing levels of the presence of charismatic authority
contributes to the choice in operational tactics (e.g., weapon and target choices) and the
results of attack outcomes (e.g., success rates, lethality) within a sample of thirty
international terrorist groups. In the concluding section, relevant findings, policy
recommendations, study limitations, and areas for future research are discussed.
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Introduction
In a recent Washington Post article about the leadership of the Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the author reflected in length upon the levels of
extreme devotion granted to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi by the rank-and-file
membership:
“Baghdadi’s ability to inspire such intense support worries U.S.
officials. His fighters seemingly will go anywhere and do anything for
the cause. They combine a fanatical passion with an unusual degree of
organization, technical skill and tactical planning… Baghdadi may be
more skillful in the field than either of his mentors, Osama bin Laden
or Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq… The ISIS
leader, in sum, is a clever, disciplined, violent and charismatic man–
with an eye for manipulating Muslim public opinion.”1
From the way al-Baghdadi is described, it is evident that he is not a typical
“run-of-the-mill” leader. There is something special that differentiates him
from other terrorists. He possesses ineffable qualities that allow him to
invoke the fanatical loyalty of his followers, who are willing to lay down their
lives for his cause. He embodies a potent blend of strong personality,
fanaticism, and apparent piety that serves as a rallying cry for the creation of
an Islamist state. The implication is that al-Baghdadi’s charisma, and the
charismatic qualities of leaders like him, present a significant challenge to
Western efforts to combat Islamist terrorism.
The academic literature on the relationship between charismatic authority
and strategic organization in benevolent and violent groups is robust and
multidisciplinary.2 Since the 1980s, scholars of management science have
increasingly acknowledged that charisma is a key component in effective

David Ignatius, “A Terrorist with Gang-Leader Charisma,” The Washington Post 24
(June, 2014), available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatiusabu-bakr-al-baghdadi-the-terrorist-with-gang-leadercharisma/2014/06/24/c4a88f2c-fbd2-11e3-8176-f2c941cf35f1_story.html.
2 For example: Bass, Bernard M., Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations
(New York: The Free Press, 1985); Burns, James MacGregor, Leadership (New York:
Harper Perennial, 1978); Lorne L. Dawson, “Crises of Charismatic Legitimacy and Violent
Behaviour in New Religious Movements,” in D.G. Bromley and J.G. Melton (eds.), Cults,
Religion & Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 80-101; Rustow,
Dankwart, Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership (New York: George Brazilier,
1970); Willner, Ann Ruth, The Spellbinders: Charismatic Political Leadership (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); Wilson, Bryan, The Noble Savages: The Primitive
Origins of Charisma (California: Berkley, 1975).
1
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business leadership and organizational success.3 Much of this recognition is
due to the work of James Burns in his Pulitzer Prize winning book,
Leadership, which identifies two ways in which leadership can manifest.4
The first is transactional leadership, where managers “survey their
subordinates’ needs and set goals for them on the basis of the effort they can
rationally expect from their subordinates.”5 These types of leaders are
commonplace, are primarily concerned with daily operations, and do not
question larger organizational goals. The second type of leadership is
transformational, which is conceptually tied to charismatic authority. In
contrast to the day-to-day management involved in transactional leadership,
transformational leaders “engage the full person of the follower” by arousing a
higher level of need.6 In simpler terms, transformational leaders motivate
their subordinates to become personally invested in the well-being and
growth of their employer. There are many colloquial examples of charismatic
and transformational business leaders such as Lee Iaococa (Chrysler),
Richard Branson (Virgin), and Steve Jobs (Apple), who seemingly singlehandedly turned around the fortunes of their companies. The effects of
transformational leadership on corporate success has been extensively tested,
and findings suggest that charismatic business leaders have a real-world
effect on the strategic and organizational behaviors of their employees.7
The study of how charismatic leaders influence strategic dynamics in violent
organizations has also been analysed empirically, particularly in the case of
the minority of cults and new religious movements that turn towards violence.
Scholars of new religious movements have noted that the escalation to
violence in cultic movements is often tied to deviant social dynamics involving
charismatic authority.8 A paradigmatic example is the case of the highly
See Bryman, Alan, Charisma and & Leadership in Organizations (London: Sage, 1992),
91; J.A. Conger, “Theoretical Foundations of Charismatic Leadership,” in J.A. Conger and
R.N. Kanungo (eds.), Charismatic Leadership: The Elusive Factor in Organizational
Effectiveness (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1988), 23-36.
4 Burns, Leadership.
5 Bass, Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations, 13.
6 Ibid., 14.
7 See Bass, Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations; Bass, Bernard and Riggio,
Ronald, Transformational Leadership (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2006); Jane Howell
and Bruce Avolio, “Transformational Leadership, Transactional Leadership, Locus of
Control, and Support for Innovation: Key Predictors of Consolidated-Business-Unit
Performance,” Journal of Applied Psychology 78: 6 (1993), 891-902.
8 For example: Dawson, “Crises of Charismatic Legitimacy”; Thomas Robbins, “Sources of
Volatility in Religious Movements,” in D.G. Bromley and J.G. Melton (eds.), Cults,
Religion & Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 57-79; Wessinger,
Catherine, How the Millennium Comes Violently: From Jonestown to Heaven’s Gate
(New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2000).
3
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charismatic Shoko Asahara and his adherents in Aum Shinrykyo. In response
to his waning authority and pressures to fulfill certain apocalyptical
prophecies, Asahara masterminded the Tokyo subway sarin gas attacks in
1995 that killed thirteen individuals and injured thousands.9 The influence of
charismatic leaders on strategic dynamics has also been examined to a lesser
degree in the context of radical and terrorist groups. In a survey administered
to 650 religious Muslim men who participated in a “Jerusalem Day” protest
march in 2002, Ayla Schbley and Clark McCauley noted a significant
relationship between charismatic authority and respondents’ willingness to
use CBRN (chemical, radiological, biological, and nuclear) weapons.10
Researchers interested in malevolent creativity within terrorist groups have
also recognized the importance of charismatic leaders and entrepreneurs to
the creation of innovative strategic behavior.11 This suggests that, much like
in the case of benevolent organizations, diverse factors involving charismatic
authority affect strategic behaviors of violent organizations and their
members.
There are many historical and contemporary instances of charismatic
terrorist leaders who have risen to lead violent political action against
perceived injustices. Obvious examples include Shoko Asahara of Aum
Shinrykyo, Abdullah Ocalan of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party, Abimael
Guzman of the Shining Path, Vellupillai Parabakharan of the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Andreas Baader of the Red Army Faction, and Osama
Bin Laden of al-Qaida. Yet, despite the prevalence of charismatic terrorist
leaders, there has been relatively little scholarly research on how charisma
influences important social and strategic dynamics within terrorist groups.12
This gap in knowledge persists despite widespread acknowledgement by
See Lifton, Robert, Destroying the World to Save It: Aum Shinrikyo, Apocalyptic
Violence, and the New Global Terrorism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1999); Reader,
Ian, Religious Violence in Contemporary Japan: The Case of Aum Shinrikyo (Surrey:
Curzon Press, 2000).
10 Ayla Schbley and Clark McCauley, “Political, Religious, and Psychological
Characteristics of Muslim Protest Marchers in Eight European cities: Jerusalem Day
2002,” Terrorism and Political Violence 17 (2005): 563.
11 Paul Gill, John Horgan, Samuel Hunter, and Lily Cushenbery, “Malevolent Creativity in
Terrorist Organizations,” The Journal of Creative Behavior 47: 2 (2013): 125-151; Maria
Rasmussen and Mohammed Hafez, “Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect:
Preconditions, Causes, and Predictive Indicators,” The Defense Threat Reduction Agency
at the Naval Postgraduate School, Report ASCO 2010-019 (August 2010), available at:
http://www.nps.edu/academics/centers/ccc/research/2010%20019%20terrorist%20in
novations%20in%20wme.pdf.
12 See David C. Hofmann and Lorne L. Dawson, “The Neglected Role of Charismatic
Authority in the Operation of Terrorist groups and the Process of Radicalization,” Studies
in Conflict & Terrorism 37: 4 (2014): 349, 355; Ingram, Haroro, The Charismatic
Leadership Phenomenon in Radical and Militant Islamism (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), 1-4.
9
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scholars of the importance of charismatic authority in the recruitment and
radicalization of terrorist operatives. For example:
“In many of the reviewed studies, evidence seems to indicate the
importance of the influence of a peer group or significant other - a
charismatic leader, a family member or a trusted peer - as a key in
initiating and driving the radicalization process. Many indicate the
increasing importance of the peer group leader with regard to outreach
and recruitment, not least because overt and top-down recruitment
has become more difficult in Europe due to countermeasures of
authorities.”13
Scholars also acknowledge that charismatic authority plays an important role
in how some terrorist groups operate, strategize, and execute successful
attacks:
“In order for a group of people with a grievance to turn into a terrorist
cell, they need an effective leader. This leadership comes in two forms:
operational and charismatic. These two qualities are sometimes found
in separate people in a group and sometimes in one person.
Operational and charismatic leadership are vital in providing training,
motivation, discipline and group cohesiveness. Leadership within the
group is the determinant in terrorist “success”.”14
Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, “Violent Radicalization in Europe: What we Know and What we
do not Know,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33 (2010): 810; See also: Crelinsten,
Ronald, Counterterrorism (Cambridge: Polity, 2009), 36-37; Lorne L. Dawson, “The
Study of New Religious Movements and the Radicalization of Home-Grown Terrorists:
Opening a Dialogue,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22 (2010): 9; Hamm, Mark, The
Spectacular Few: Prisoner Radicalization and the Evolving Terrorist Threat (New York:
New York University Press, 2013); Dipak Gupta, “Exploring Roots of Terrorism,” in Tore
Bjorgo (ed.), Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward, (London:
Routledge, 2005), 19; Mirra Noor Milla, Faturochman Ancok, and Djamaludin Ancok,
“The Impact of Leader-Follower Interactions on the Radicalisation of Terrorists: A Case
Study of the Bali Bombers,” Asian Journal of Social Psychology 16 (2013): 92-100; Petter
Nesser, “Joining Jihadi Terrorism Cells in Europe: Exploring Motivations, Aspects of
Recruitment and Radicalization,” in Magnus Ranstorp (ed.), Understanding Violent
Radicalization: Terrorist and Jihadi Movements in Europe, (New York: Routledge,
2009), 96-97; Vertigans, Stephen, The Sociology of Terrorism: People, Places and
Processes (London: Routledge, 2011), 106-107.
14 Michael Silber and Arvin Bhatt, “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat,”
(New York: New York Police Department, 2007): 50, available at:
http://www.readbag.com/nypdshield-public-sitefiles-documents-nypd-reportradicalization-in-the-west; See also: Ersel Aydinli, “From Finances to Transnational
Mobility: Searching for the Global Jihadists’ Achilles Heel,” Terrorism and Political
Violence 18 (2006): 307; Or Honig, “Explaining Israel’s Misuse of Strategic
Assassinations,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30 (2007): 571; Fathali Moghaddam, “A
Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” American Psychologist 60 (2005):
13
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The common refrain in the terrorism literature is that leaders, particularly
charismatic ones, are important to social processes involved in the formation,
operation, and demise of their groups. Despite this recognition, a number of
pressing questions remain unanswered: How exactly do charismatic terrorist
leaders inspire such fanatical levels of devotion from their followers? Are
there strategic differences between charismatically-led and other types of
terrorist groups? Are charismatically-led terrorist groups more prone to
certain types of behaviors than other types of terrorist organizations? Given
the worrisome ability of certain terrorist leaders like al-Baghdadi to inspire
intense devotion among their followers, it is clear that further scholarly
analysis is needed if we are to understand how to properly combat this genre
of Islamist fundamentalism.
To date, the terrorism literature that mentions charismatic authority is largely
speculative, and there is little empirical research backing up the majority of
statements made by scholars about the charismatic nature of certain terrorist
leaders.15 Therefore, the objective of this study is to begin addressing this gap
in knowledge by quantitatively examining how differing levels of charismatic
authority may influence operational tactics and attack outcomes within
terrorist groups. It builds directly from the concluding remarks made by
David Hofmann and Lorne Dawson that call for more robust empirical
analyses of charismatic terrorist leadership.16 At this early stage, this study
does not seek to authoritatively test specific claims made by terrorism
scholars about charismatic terrorist leaders. Rather, it purposefully takes a
broad inductive approach. As a result, no specific predictions or hypotheses
are made in order to allow for the post hoc application of findings to help
strengthen or discredit what we believe to know about the relationship
between charismatic terrorist leadership and the strategic operation and
outcomes of terrorist attacks.
This article begins with a brief overview of the theoretical background on
charismatic authority, although space and scope constraints limit an in-depth
162; Nesser, “Joining Jihadi Terrorism Cells in Europe,” 98; Jerrold Post, “When Hatred
is Bred in the Bone: Psycho-Cultural Foundations of Contemporary Terrorism,” Political
Psychology 26 (2005): 620; Richardson, Louise, What Terrorists Want: Understanding
the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New York: Random House, 2006), 45.
15 See David C. Hofmann, “Quantifying and Qualifying Charisma: A Theoretical
Framework for Measuring the Presence of Charismatic Authority in Terrorist Groups,”
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 38 (2015): 710-733, available at:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1048100#.VZGu8UbQM
QQ; Hofmann and Dawson, “The Neglected Role of Charismatic Authority.”
16 See Hofmann and Dawson, “The Neglected Role of Charismatic Authority,” 362-363.
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explanation.17 This is then followed by a presentation of the data, methods,
and measures used during analysis. Results from frequency, bivariate, and
multivariate models that examine the relationship between varying levels of
the presence of charismatic authority, operational tactics (e.g., weapon choice,
target choices), and the outcome of terrorist attacks (e.g., success rates,
lethality, number of wounded) are then presented. The article finally
concludes with a discussion of results, policy recommendations, study
limitations, and areas for future research.

What is Charismatic Authority?
The theoretical basis for charismatic authority is derived primarily from Max
Weber’s discussion of legitimate domination.18 In his analysis of how and
why people submit to the dominion of others, Weber identifies three “idealtypes”19 of authority: 1) traditional; 2) rational-legal; and 3) charismatic.
Traditional authority is the acceptance of an individual’s or office-holder’s
power that is based upon long-standing socio-cultural norms, customs, or
traditions (e.g., a monarch, a tribal chieftain). Rational-legal authority
demands obedience based upon the recognized power that is intrinsically
invested in an office or position (e.g., law enforcement and elected officials).
Traditional and rational-legal forms of authority are typically stable, and are
focused on the routine, day-to-day governance over a group, organization, or
country. In other words, these forms of authority base their legitimacy on
well-entrenched hierarchical and bureaucratic social structures. However,
when in its “ideal-typical” form, charismatic authority is established in direct
opposition to traditional and rational-legal forms of domination. Rather than
deriving their authority from long-standing traditions or bureaucratized
offices, charismatic leaders demand obedience from their followers based
upon the recognition of some extraordinary, supernatural, or divine quality.
As Weber explains, it is this “extraordinariness” that differentiates

For a more comprehensive overview of charismatic authority in the context of terrorism
studies, consult Hofmann and Dawson, “The Neglected Role of Charismatic Authority,”
350-355.
18 Max Weber, Economy and Society, G. Roth and C. Wittich (eds.), (Berkley: University
of California Press, 1978), 212-245.
19 An “ideal-type” (also known as “pure” type) is a sociological concept developed by
Weber. Ideal-types are primarily used to by social scientists to compare and analyze
abstract social scientific concepts. They consist of a number of characteristics used to
describe a social phenomenon which, will never manifest in a “pure” sense in reality. For
example, a leader will never actually display all the characteristics of a “pure” charismatic
leader. Rather, he/she will display varying elements, traits, and relationships that qualify
them as “charismatic” when using the ideal-typical definition of a charismatic leader as a
point of reference.
17
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charismatic leaders from their traditional and rational-legal counterparts:
“[Charisma is] a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue
of which he is set apart from ordinary men, and treated as endowed
with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional
powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the
ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary,
and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a
leader.”20
This perceived “extraordinariness” can vary greatly.21 People may submit to a
charismatic leader based upon perceptions of something as simple as superior
oratorical skills, or followers may fervently believe in the god-like nature of
the charismatic leader. Regardless of how it manifests, if a truly charismatic
leader manages to gather a following, perceptions of the leader’s exceptional
nature can move and inspire adherents to surrender themselves completely to
the fulfillment of the leader’s stated goals.22 As Dawson notes, there are other
social, strategic, and structural conditions that need to be met in order for a
charismatic leader to be successful.23 But, if established, the bond between
charismatic leaders and their followers is truly unique: “In its “pure form”
charismatic authority involves a degree of commitment on the part of the
disciples that has no parallel in [traditional and rational-legal] types of
domination.”24 It is this special bond of love and loyalty formed between a
charismatic leader and his or her flock that serves as a catalyst for the
commission of both remarkable and terrible acts.
Scholars note that charismatic authority tends to manifest primarily during
times of socio-cultural, political, and religious turmoil.25 If traditional and
Max Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building, S.N. Eisenstadt (ed.), (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 48.
21 John Gordon Melton, “When Prophets Die: The Succession Crisis in New Religions,” in
When Prophets Die: The Postcharismatic Fate of New Religious Movements, Timothy
Miller (ed.), (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 2.
22 Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (Berkley: University of
California Press, 1977), 300.
23 Lorne L. Dawson, “Charismatic Leadership in Millennial Movements,” in Catherine
Wessinger (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Millennialism (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011), 121-123.
24 Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait, 300.
25 Dawson, “Charismatic Leadership in Millennial Movements,” 119-124; William H.
Friedland, “For a Sociological Concept of Charisma,” Social Forces 42: 1 (1964): 22-24;
Ingram, The Charismatic Leadership Phenomenon, 20-21; Douglas Madsen and Peter
Snow, The Charismatic Bond: Political Behavior in Time of Crisis (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1991), 14-23; Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building, 19; Wilson,
The Noble Savages, 26-31.
20
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rational-legal forms of authority are seen as incapable of resolving the crisis,
people can become “charisma hungry” in search of a resolution.26 There are
numerous historical examples of this phenomenon. Charismatic leaders like
Adolf Hitler, Mohandas Gandhi, Winston Churchill, Joan of Arc, and Martin
Luther King Jr. almost always stand at the heart of social and political
movements that challenge conventional norms and drastically alter the social
landscape, for good or for ill. Since the basis for a charismatic leader’s
authority lies in the perception of the extraordinary qualities of an individual,
they are not hampered by the rules and traditions which govern the more
stable forms of authority. As a result, the power that they wield can be
virtually unrestricted in its scope.27 In this sense, charismatic authority is
both anti-institutional and a force for change. Given the tumultuous, changeoriented nature of charismatic authority, it is unsurprising that terrorism is
fertile soil for the emergence of charismatic leaders who are focused on social
and political change through the use of coercive violence.28
As a final note, the type of relationship formed between charismatic leaders
and their followers is best conceived as a mutually-established dyadic bond:
“The general consensus among scholars is that the focal point of
research should be the relationship between the charismatic leader
and his or her followers and not the individual psychological qualities
of the leaders. This relationship, also known as “the charismatic
bond,” is socially constructed through a complex process of
negotiation. It rests on an exchange of mutual needs, where the
charismatic leader is granted authority by the followers in return for
recognition, affection, and reinforcement of worth (emphasis
original).”29
In simpler terms, the charismatic relationship should not be understood as
the unilateral imposition of the leader’s strong will upon his or her mindless
followers. Rather, both leaders and followers are active participants in the
formation of the charismatic bond, and both parties gain something from the
Dawson, “Charismatic Leadership in Millennial Movements,” 121-123; Korany, Baghat,
Social Change, Charisma and International Behaviour: Toward a theory of PolicyMaking in the Third World (Geneve: Institute Universitaire de Hautes Etudes
Internationales, 1976).
27 Eileen Barker, “Charismatization: The Social Production of ‘an Ethos Propitious to the
Mobilisation of Sentiments,” in E. Barker, J.A. Beckford and K. Dobbelaere (eds.),
Secularization, Rationalism and Sectarianism: Essays in Honor of Bryan R. Wilson
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 182-183.
28 Rasmussen and Hafez, “Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect,” 84.
29 Hofmann and Dawson, “The Neglected Role of Charismatic Authority,” 351.
26
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relationship. As a result, there is scholarly agreement that the focal point of
research on charismatic authority should be on the formation and
maintenance of this special type of relational bond.30

Data and Methods
Research Objective and Focus
The primary objective of this study is the quantitative examination of the
relationship between varying levels of the presence of charismatic authority
(PCA) among a sample of thirty international terrorist groups (n = 30) and
their strategic choices (e.g., target preferences, attack methods). It also
attempts to determine whether groups with higher levels of the PCA are likely
to be more successful and/or more destructive (reflected by lethality rates and
number of wounded victims/perpetrators). This study employs a predictor
variable that was coded using a theoretical framework (the “PCA indicators”)
designed for measuring the presence of charismatic authority within and
across terrorist groups.31 The predictor variable was then used to test the
relationship between the PCA scores of each group in the sample with a
number of outcome variables that reflect a range of strategic choices and
attack outcomes.
The current study focuses exclusively on non-state actors, rather than
exploring the presence of charismatic authority within the contexts of either
insurgent or state terrorism. The decision to exclude state terrorism from the
analysis was due to the nature of the authority relationships examined in this
study. Charismatic authority within small and clandestine groups is based on
according power to an individual who actively challenges and seeks to replace
established social norms and governance, while “charismatic” political leaders
typically operate within the bureaucratized structure of traditional or
rational-legal authority. In other words, the charisma attributed to “likeable”
political leaders is superficial and is not the same sort of intense and personal
bond formed between a “pure” charismatic leader and his or her followers.32
There are very few politicians who are venerated by followers in the same
manner as highly charismatic terrorist leaders. This does not mean that the
Barker, “Charismatization”; Madsen and Snow, The Charismatic Bond; Roy Wallis,
“Charisma and Explanation,” in Secularization, Rationalism and Sectarianism: Essays
in Honor of Bryan R. Wilson, eds. E. Barker, J.A. Beckford and K. Dobbelaere (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1993), 167-179; Willner, The Spellbinders.
30

Hofmann, “Quantifying and Qualifying Charisma.”
See Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait, 298-307; Hofmann and Dawson,
“The Neglected Role of Charismatic Authority,” 349.
31

32

22
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 9, No. 2

PCA indicators cannot be adapted to account for certain extreme types of
charismatic political leaders and dictators who perpetrate or support state
terrorism (e.g., Ayotollah Khomeni, Kim Jong Un, Muammar Gaddafi). But
the theoretical framework presented in this study focuses on the “idealtypical” charismatic relationship that is antithetical to traditional and
rational-legal forms of authority, and is therefore better suited for analyzing
non-state terrorist groups.

Dataset
The data were taken from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is
maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism (START).33 The GTD uses publically available and
unclassified data to record various characteristics of incidents of terrorist
violence from events occurring between 1970 and 2011. Data sources include
media articles, electronic news archives, existing datasets, books, journals,
and legal documents. This limits the incidents within the study sample to
successfully executed attacks that have been recorded by START and whose
details are known to the general public.

Sample Selection and Data Inclusion
The focus on contrasting a group level variable (the PCA within terrorist
groups) with incident-based data led to the creation of a modified dataset
with hierarchical data (also known as nested or clustered data) comprising of
two distinct levels. The first level includes the various descriptive variables
for each incident (e.g., attack type, number of perpetrators, number of
victims), which are nested in the second level of data, comprised of the thirty
terrorist groups that make up the study sample. The hierarchical nature of
the data necessitated the use of survey-based variance estimates for models at
the bivariate level, and the use of random intercept multi-level models at the
multivariate level to account for the non-independence of cases.
For the selection of groups, each distinct terrorist organization listed in the
GTD was given a sequential numerical value. A random number generator
was then used to select groups for the sample. The viability of each group for
inclusion in the final sample was assessed during the coding process. Those
with insufficient available information (e.g., language issues,
security/publication bans) to allow for comprehensive coding were discarded.

START: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
Global Terrorism Database [Datafile], 2012, available at: http://start.umd.edu/gtd.
33
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The groups included in the final sample are listed in Table 1, in descending
order of PCA scores.
Table 1: List of Groups Included in Final Sample in Rank Order from Highest
to Lowest PCA Score
Group Name
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
Taliban
Shining Path
Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK)
Hizballah
Jewish Defense League (JDL)
Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA)
Jemaah Islamiya (JI)
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC)
Baader-Meinhof Group
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
Red Army Faction (RAF)
al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP)
National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN)
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)
New People’s Army
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF)
Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA)
Army of God
Irish Republican Army (IRA)
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
(FMLN)
Animal Liberation Front (ALF)
Weather Underground
Red Brigades
Action Directe

In order to avoid blindly blending multiple off-shoot groups into the larger
organizations from which they were created, attack incidents in the GTD
executed by a splinter or sub-group were excluded from the final dataset (e.g.,
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when an alternate group is listed). This was done in order to avoid the
conflation of terrorist organizations with similar ideologies, goals, and
methods, but whose levels of the PCA may have differed greatly. This limits
the data somewhat, because it is impossible to correctly identify the “true”
perpetrators of terrorist incidents one-hundred percent of the time. Findings
should be interpreted with this limitation in mind.
The incident data nested within the thirty terrorist groups chosen for analysis
were also subjected to three inclusion criteria: 1) the selected incident must
not have been in doubt as to whether it was a terrorist act (using the doubt
terrorism proper variable when data were available); 2) the selected incident
was perpetrated by an actual known terrorist entity, as opposed to suspected
umbrella affiliations (Kashmiri separatists, Jewish radicals, anti-abortion
activists etc.); and 3) the selected incident conformed to all three GTD
definitions of terrorism. Incidents that did not conform to these three criteria
were excluded. The GTD’s three criteria for the definition of terrorism are as
follows:




The incident must be intentional
The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence
The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors34

Table 2: Coding Scheme for PCA Scores
Code
0
1
2

3

4
5

34

Qualitative Statement
Never the case
(0% of the time)
Rarely the case
(<25% of the time)
Sometimes the case
(Between 25-49% of the
time)
Often the case
(Between 50-74% of the
time)
Very often the case
(Between 75-99% of the
time)
Always the case
(100% of the time)

START, “Global Terrorism Database Codebook,” 6.
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As a result, the modified dataset was limited to incidents perpetrated by
known non-state actors who committed clearly identifiable acts of terrorism,
as per the GTD’s definition. After application of the inclusion/exclusion
criteria, a total of 18,172 terrorist incidents were included in the final
modified dataset, nested within thirty terrorist groups.

Coding the Predictor Variable
The GTD is a critical incident database of terrorist attacks that collects
information on variables such as methods of attack, fatalities, property
damage, tactics used, etc. The data are meant to provide a broad overview of
terrorist activities and methods, but reveal little about the social realities
within the groups themselves, such as ideology, motivations, and
relationships. Therefore, no existing variable within the GTD can be used to
gauge the presence of charismatic authority within the groups listed in the
database. As a result, the construction of a variable capable of assessing the
presence of charismatic authority within terrorist groups was required. This
was done by using a list of fourteen indicators (the “PCA indicators”) meant to
assist in the qualitative and/or quantitative operationalization of charismatic
authority in the context of terrorist groups. The PCA indicators are based on
Weber’s theories of legitimate domination, as well as empirical insights from
charismatic authority in new religious movements. Full descriptions of each
indicator are available in the article outlining the theoretical framework.35
The list of indicators are as follows:
1. Are attributions of power to the leader based on the followers’
perception of the leader’s supernatural or superhuman and/or
exceptional powers and qualities?
2. Is the authority of the leader interpreted in terms of ingrained and
traditional conceptions of charismatic authority in the broader society
and culture?
3. Is authority attributed to the leader on the basis of the perception that
there is an impending or current crisis, one associated with the
bankruptcy of existing forms of traditional and/or rational-legal forms
of authority?
4. Is the authority attributed to the leader associated with any physical
impairment or suffering which is viewed positively by the followers?

35

See Hofmann, “Quantifying and Qualifying Charisma,” 715-721.
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5. Does the leader legitimate their authority through reference to a higher
source of authority, either divine or some other transcendent source
(i.e., a supreme ideology)?
6. Are grandiose and exaggerated claims made about the nature and
scope of the leader’s authority and importance?
7. Are new members socialized into recognizing the special powers and
authority of the leader?
8. Does the leader figure prominently in the folklore of the group and the
representation of its ‘story’?
9. Are organizational decisions highly centralized and reliant on the will
of the leader?
10. Is the leader intolerant of alternative sources of power and authority,
both internal and external to the group?
11. Does the leader introduce sudden and /or seemingly arbitrary changes
in the practices and policies of the group?
12. Do followers readily accept these sudden and/or seemingly arbitrary
changes in the practices and policies of the group?
13. Is the delegation of authority highly centralized and reliant on the will
of the leader?
14. Does the legitimacy of subordinate leaders in the group depend on the
nature of their personal relationship with the leader?
On a group-to-group basis, coding involved assigning a value to each of the
PCA indicators using a scale ranging between zero and five. Each number on
the scale corresponds with a qualitative descriptor. The coding scheme used
is available in Table 2. Using the scale as a guide, the coder made an
informed choice based on available sources of information before assigning a
value for each indicator. A coding table was constructed for each group,
which allowed for annotation and organization of material for each indicator.
Triangulation methods were used as much as possible to ensure that the data
used for analysis was reliable.36 Information on groups were gleaned from
case studies, peer-reviewed articles, scholarly books, historical accounts,
online videos, biographies, as well as media and journalistic accounts taken
from the Factiva and Lexis-Nexis databases. Each group was meticulously
researched prior to actual coding. In cases where groups had undefined or
unclear leadership (e.g., multiple leaders, spiritual vs. operational leaders),
the coder made an informed judgement call and the leader most involved in
See Todd Jick, “Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Triangulation in Action,”
Administrative Science Quarterly 24: 4 (1979): 602-611; Wendy Olsen, “Triangulation in
Social Research: Qualitative and Quantitative Methods Can be Really Mixed,” in M.
Holborn (ed.), Developments in Sociology (Ormskirk UK: Causeway Press, 2004).
36
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the creation and shaping of the group’s ideology was chosen for analysis. If
multiple leaders were responsible for creating and shaping the group’s
ideology, they were all considered as a single entity for the purposes of coding.
Coding for the current study was done individually by the author.37

Measures
Predictor Variable: Presence of Charismatic Authority Scale (PCA scale)
Upon completion of the coding process, the fourteen PCA indicators were
added together to create the predictor variable: The PCA scale. Since the
indicators have not been tested for reliability elsewhere, a test-retest
reliability analysis with an 18-month time lag was conducted by re-coding the
PCA scores of a random subset of ten groups taken from the study sample.38
The results of the test-retest reliability analysis indicate an acceptable level of
correlation (r = 0.781), which suggests that the coding process was reliable.
In addition, a principle components analysis test (direct oblimin) was
conducted to ensure internal consistency of the PCA score. The results of the
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test (.801) and Bartlett’s test (p < .001) indicated the
suitability of a principal components analysis. There are three eigenvalues
over 1 (8.223, 1.601 and 1.087), however the scree plot indicates strong
evidence for a single factor solution. All items aside from 3, 4, and 5, load
onto the same latent factor. Cronbach’s alpha for the eleven-item PCA scale is
.954, which indicates a high level of internal consistency. As a result, the final
PCA scale was constructed from eleven of the fourteen indicators (items 1-2,
6-14). The mean PCA score for the sample was 21.03 (observed range = 0-50;
SD = 14.95). The scale is normally distributed.

Outcome Variables
The outcome variables chosen for analysis reflect a large range of attack
outcomes, behaviors, tactics, and operational choices made by terrorist
groups in the sample, but are constrained by what is available within the
GTD. A total of eleven outcome variables were included in the models, and
can be broadly categorized in two main groups: 1) ‘operational choices’; and

For access to the dataset used in this analysis, please contact the author via email.
The test-rest reliability analysis was chosen due to the fact there was only a single coder
for the PCA scores. Since coding PCA scores for each group was time intensive, it was
unfeasible to add a second coder for the purposes of inter-rater reliability analyses. In
order to avoid bias that could distort the results of the second round of coding, research
for each group was conducted with a “clean slate” approach that did not draw on previous
notes from the first round of coding.
37

38
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2) ‘attack outcomes’.39 ‘Operational choice’ variables include measures meant
to identify preferences of tactics, targets, and methods for terrorist attacks. It
consists of six variables: 1) suicide attack? (dichotomous yes/no); 2) attack
type (nominal with 10 categories); 3) target type (nominal with 22
categories); 4) weapon type (nominal with 13 categories); 5) number of
perpetrators; and 6) hostage/kidnapping victims? (dichotomous yes/no).
‘Attack outcomes’ consists of a total of five variables that measure the
aftermath of each incident: 1) successful attack? (dichotomous yes/no); 2)
number of victim fatalities; 3) number of perpetrator fatalities; 4) number of
injured victims; and 5) number of perpetrators injured. Detailed
descriptions of each outcome variable and their categories are available
within the GTD coding handbook.40 A full list of the outcome variables
chosen for analysis are available in Table 3.
Table 3: List of Outcome Variables

Operational Choices
Suicide Attack?
Attack Type
Target Type
Weapon Type
Number of Perpetrators
Hostage/Kidnapping Victims?

Attack Outcomes
Successful Attack?
Number of Victim Fatalities
Number of Perpetrator Fatalities
Number of Injured Victims
Number of Perpetrators Injured

Control Variables
For the multivariate models, three additional control variables were included
to account for differences across geographical regions, time periods, and
group ideology. The region control variable consists of thirteen nominal
categories that divided incidents into large continental and geographical
regions (South America, Western Europe, South Asia, Central America &
Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, Southeast Asia, North America,
Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, and Australia & Oceania). The decade
control variable consists of four time periods: The 1970’s, 1980’s, 1990’s, and
In order to properly interpret whether or not charismatic forms of leadership influence
more extreme or aggressive forms of behaviors among their followers, the severity of
strategies or attacks employed by terrorist groups need to be qualitatively ordered.
Therefore for the purposes of this study, attack types, targets, and strategies that have a
higher likelihood of causing personal or bodily harm (e.g., the use of assassination, armed
assault, bombings/explosions, the targeting of private citizens and police, and so on) are
treated as more extreme and aggressive forms of behavior than those with a lesser
likelihood of the same outcome (e.g., hijacking, hostage taking, targeting utilities and
water supply, and so on).
40 START, “Global Terrorism Database.”
39
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2000-2011. Lastly, a broadly defined ideology control variable was included
to account for ideological differences across the sample (ethno-nationalist,
right-wing, left-wing, and religious).41
Table 4: Attack Incident Frequency across Groups
Group Name
Action Directe
Al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya
Animal Liberation Front
Armed Islamic Group
Army of God
Baader Meinhof Group
ETA
FMLN
Hezbollah
Irish Republican Army
Jemaah Islamiya
Jewish Defense League
PKK
LTTE
Lord’s Resistance Army

Frequency
48
239
90
197
23
88
1,663
2,098
163
1,587
70
78
806
973
140

Group Name
MILF
ELN
New People’s Army
PLO
Palestinian Islamic Jihad
PFLP
Red Brigades
FARC
Shining Path
SLA
Taliban
MRTA
Ulster Freedom Fighters
Ulster Volunteer Force
Weathermen

Frequency
186
1,081
800
74
94
110
199
1,263
3,970
4
1,151
516
217
234
40

Results
Frequency statistics for attack incidents perpetrated by the study sample are
available in Table 4. The descriptive statistics for attack incidents indicate
that the groups within the study sample committed an average of 606
terrorist attacks (ranging from 4 to 3,970 attack incidents). The median value
is 198 terrorist attacks, and there is a high amount of dispersion (SD =
858.42).
Descriptive statistics for the five higher-order outcome variables are available
in Table 5 and provide information on: 1) number of perpetrators; 2) number
of victim fatalities; 3) number of perpetrator fatalities; 4) number of injured
victims; and 5) number of perpetrators injured. The data show that on
average, terrorist incidents involved around 31 perpetrators (M = 31.26),
though slightly more than half were committed by groups of five or fewer
perpetrators (57% of incidents). The lethality of attacks within the sample
The ideological categories were purposefully chosen to be broad (e.g., ‘Religious’
instead of ‘Islamist’/ ‘Fundamentalist Christian’, and so on) to account for the relatively
small sample (n = 30). In case where a certain group could be described with multiple
ideological categories (e.g., the PKK as ethno-nationalist and leftist), a judgement call was
made by the coder to choose the primary ideology that best fit the group.
41
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appeared to have been relatively low, with an average of close to two victim
fatalities (M = 1.99) per incident. The vast majority of attacks (n = 9,521)
resulted in no victim casualties, and more than 95 percent of attacks claimed
10 lives or less. There are similar trends for the number of victims wounded
(M = 2.72), with 77 percent of attacks (n = 12,121) resulting in no injuries
among victims, and 96 percent of attacks resulting in ten or fewer injuries.
Among the perpetrators, there were relatively few fatalities (M = 0.36) and
injuries (M = 0.05) per incident. Close to 88 percent of terrorist attacks (n =
3,200) resulted in no fatalities among the perpetrators, and 97 percent of
attacks resulted in three fatalities or fewer among the perpetrators. Findings
are similar for the number of perpetrators injured, with 98 percent of
incidents (n = 3,435) indicating no injuries.
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Higher-Order Outcome Variables
Mean

SD

Max

n

Min
Number of Perpetrators
Number of Victim Fatalities
Number of Perpetrator Fatalities
Number of Injured Victims
Number of Perpetrators Injured

31.26
1.99
0.36
2.72
0.05

74.23
7.06
2.07
80.81
0.49

0
0
0
0
0

1,000
375
70
10,000
11

2,640
16,681
3,665
16,065
3,498

Table 6: Frequency Statistics for Dichotomous Outcome Variables
No
Successful attack?
Suicide attack?
Hostages or Kidnapping?

1,291
17,905
16,574

Yes

n

16,880
267
1,579

18,171
18,172
18,153

Table 6 displays the frequency statistics for the three dichotomous variables:
1) successful attack?; 2) suicide attack?; and 3) hostages or kidnapping
victims? Nearly 93 percent of attack incidents were deemed successful (n =
16,880), and less than two percent of attacks involved suicide tactics (n =
267). Lastly, approximately nine percent of incidents (n = 1,579) involved
kidnapping or hostage taking.
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Table 7: Frequency statistics for Attack Type, Weapon Type, Target Type, Region, Decade and
Ideology
Frequency

%

Attack Type:
Bombing/Explosion
Armed Assault
Assassination
Facility/Infrastructure
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)
Other/Unknown
Hostage Taking (Barricade)
Hijacking
Unarmed Assault

8,169
3,857
3,037
1,298
1,094
450
197
46
24

45.0
21.2
16.7
7.1
6.0
2.5
1.1
0.3
0.1

Region:
South America
Western Europe
South Asia
Central America & Caribbean
Middle East and North Africa
Southeast Asia
North America
Sub-Saharan Africa
Eastern Europe
Australia and Oceania

6,829
4,231
2,124
2,099
1,474
1,055
209
146
4
1

37.6
23.3
11.7
11.6
8.1
5.8
1.2
0.8
0.0
0.0

Decade:
1970-1979 (1970s)
1980-1989 (1980s)
1990-1999 (1990s)
2001-2011 (2000 onwards)

1,676
7,956
5,423
3,117

9.2
43.8
29.8
17.2

Ideology:
Left-wing
Ethno-nationalist
Religious
Right-wing

10,196
5,634
2,341
0

56.1
31.0
12.9
0.0

Frequen
cy

%

Target Type:
Private Citizens/Property
Business
Police
Government (General)
Utilities
Non-Aviation Transport
Military
Educational Institutions
Journalists/Media
Government (Diplomatic)
Religious figures/locales
Other
Telecommunication
Airports and Airlines
Unknown
Other Terrorists
NGOs
Tourists
Food/Water Supply
Violent Political Parties
Maritime Transportation
Abortion Related

3,781
3,604
2,549
2,427
2,023
1,006
510
376
332
284
248
225
173
127
101
101
70
65
56
47
45
22

20.8
19.8
14.0
13.4
11.1
5.5
2.8
2.1
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.7
0.6
0.6
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.1

Weapon Type:
Explosives/Bombs/TNT
Firearms
Other/Unknown
Incendiary
Melee
Chemical
Sabotage Equipment
Vehicle
Fake Weapons

8,284
6,635
1,610
1,401
204
16
9
4
1

45.6
36.5
8.9
7.7
1.1
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.0

n = 18,172

Frequency statistics for the three multi-category nominal variables (attack
type, target type, weapon type) and the three control variables (region,
decade, ideology) in Table 7 reveal a number of trends in regard to strategic
choices made by the study sample. The preferred method of attack was the
use of bombs/explosives (n = 8,169), with 45 percent of incidents involving
some form of explosive device. The other two favored methods of attack were
armed assault (n = 3,857, 21.2%) and assassination (n = 3,037, 16.7%). The
favored target was private property and citizens (n = 3,781, 20.8%), followed
by businesses (n = 3,604, 19.8%), police targets (n = 2,549, 14%), and general
government targets (n = 2,427, 13.4%). The weapon of choice for terrorist
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groups within the sample was explosives/bombs/TNT (n = 8,284), with 45.6
percent of terrorist incidents involving explosives as the primary weapon.
The next most frequent weapons of choice were firearms (n = 6,635, 36.5%),
other/unknown weapons (n = 1,610, 8.9%), and incendiary weapons (n =
1,401, 7.7%). There were no recorded terrorist events using biological,
radiological, or nuclear weapons within the study sample. Frequency
statistics for the decade, region, and ideology control variables reveal that the
majority of attack incidents occurred in the 1980s (n = 7,956, 43.8%) and
1990s (n = 5,423, 29.8%), took place mostly in South America (n = 6,829,
37.6%) and Western Europe (n = 4,231, 23.3%), and primarily involved
groups with left-wing (n = 10,196, 56.1%) and ethno-nationalist ideologies (n
= 5,634, 31%).
For the purposes of the bivariate and multivariate analyses, categories with
relatively low frequencies were recoded into their respective ‘other’ categories.
For attack type, this included hijacking (n = 46, 0.3%) and unarmed assault
(n = 24, 0.1%). For target type, the threshold for recoding was categories
with less than 100 cases (NGOs, tourists, food and water supply, violent
political parties, maritime ports and facilities, abortion related). In weapon
type, the recoded categories included chemical weapons (n = 16, 0.1%), fake
weapons (n = 1, 0.0%), vehicles (n = 4, 0.0%), and sabotage attacks (n = 9,
0.1%).
Table 8: Results of Spearman’s correlation (survey-based variance estimates) – PCA scores
by outcome variables
Spearman’s

Sig.

N

rho
Number of Victim Fatalities
Number of Perpetrator Fatalities
Number of Victims Injured
Number of Perpetrators Injured
Number of Perpetrators
*
p <.001 ** p < .05 + p <.10

0.317**
0.239
0.258
0.017
-0.258

0.006
0.746
0.304
0.166
0.591

16,681
3,665
15,814
3,498
2,640

In order to understand how the PCA scores varied according to each of the
five higher-order outcome variables at the bivariate level, Spearman
correlations (employing survey-based variance estimates to account for the
clustered data) were examined. Results are available in Table 8, and show
that the only significant relationship is number of victim fatalities (rho =
0.317, p < .05). This suggests that higher number of victim fatalities involved
in terrorist events is positively correlated with higher levels of the PCA.
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Table 9: Results of ANOVA and t-tests (survey-based variance estimates) - PCA scores by
outcome variables

Mean

LSE

Attack Typea** (F = 50.60)
Assassination
Armed Assault
Bombing/Explosion
Hostage Taking (Barricade)
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)
Facility/Infrastructure Attack
Other/Unknown

21.88
26.52
22.09
16.41
24.14
20.02
29.44

5.75
5.41
6.45
5.81
4.21
5.61
4.10

Weapon Typea (F = 0.48)
Firearms
Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
Incendiary
Melee
Other

24.01
22.15
18.69
32.61
26.99

5.36
6.26
5.31
3.90
3.81

Successful Attack?b* (t = 8.33)
No
Yes

19.39
23.40

5.05
5.58

Hostage/Kidnapping?b**
(t = 2.40)
No
Yes

23.02
23.96

5.69
4.45

*
a

p <.001

**

ANOVA

p < .05
b

+

Mean

LSE

Target Typea* (F = 100.86)
Business
Government (General)
Police
Military
Airports and Airlines
Government (Diplomatic)
Educational Institutions
Journalists and Media
Other
Private Citizens and Property
Religious Figures / Locales
Telecommunication
Other Terrorist Groups
Non-Aviation Transportation
Unknown
Utilities

19.00
26.28
25.29
23.40
24.80
26.81
31.67
19.43
28.44
25.16
31.06
18.95
17.47
24.06
23.77
16.24

5.49
5.44
4.96
6.06
4.06
4.10
4.20
5.69
4.13
5.18
3.28
7.76
5.98
5.95
5.29
10.23

Suicide Attack?b* (t = 15.49)
No
Yes

22.89
38.61

5.55
2.95

p <.10

t-test

LSE = Linearized Standard Error

The results of ANOVA tests (employing survey-based variance estimates) to
compare the differences in means of the PCA scores across the three multicategorical nominal variables (attack type, weapon type, and target type) are
available in Table 9. Attack type (F = 50.60, p < .001) and target type (F =
100.86, p < .05) are significant, and suggest that certain types of strategies
were employed in relation to higher PCA scores within the sample. In regard
to attack type, terrorist events with higher than average levels of the PCA
favored ‘other’ weapons (M = 29.44), armed assault (M = 26.52), and
kidnapping (M = 24.14). Post hoc analyses using the Scheffé criterion for
significance indicate that for attack type, the average number of errors was
significantly lower in the bombings/explosions (M = -5.47) and
facility/infrastructure (M = -1.85) conditions than in the remaining
conditions (M = 0.21 to 7.56). For target type, terrorist events that exhibited
relative higher average levels of the PCA favored attack targets such as
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educational institutions (M = 31.67), religious figures / locales (M = 31.06),
other targets than those listed (M = 28.44), and both general (M = 26.28) and
diplomatic (M = 26.81) government targets. Scheffé post hoc analysis results
for target type indicate that the average number of errors was lower in the
utilities (M = -0.04) and telecommunications (M = 0.43) conditions than in
the remaining conditions (M = 4.41 to 9.45). At the bivariate level, weapon
type was found to be non-significant (F = 1.86, p > .05), which suggests that
differing levels of PCA had no effect on the choice of weapons within the study
sample.
In order to compare differences across means, t-tests (employing surveybased variance estimates) were conducted for the remaining three
dichotomous variables (successful attack? suicide attack? and
hostages/kidnapping?). Results of the t-tests in Table 9 show that all three
relationships are significant (p < .05). Terrorist events that had higher
relative PCA scores tended to be more successful (‘No’ mean = 19.39 / ‘Yes’
mean = 23.40, p < .001). Unsurprisingly, terrorist groups that have higher
relative levels of the PCA were much more likely to engage in suicide attacks
(‘No’ mean = 22.89 / ‘Yes’ mean = 38.61, p < .001). Lastly, there is not much
difference in the means for the hostages/kidnapping? variable (‘No’ mean =
23.02 / ‘Yes’ mean = 23.96, p < .05), suggesting that while the relationship is
significant, the presence of charismatic authority did not greatly affect
whether or not the groups engaged in hostage or kidnapping events.
Table 10: Multi-level linear and logistic model regression results – centered PCA scores
predicting outcome variables

b

SE

SD

b

SE

OR

ICC

Higher-Order Variables:a
Dichotomous Variables:b
Number of Victim Fatalities
0.052
0.993
2.349
Successful Attack?
2.334*
0.378
1.014
0.040
Number of Victims Injured
0.682
0.076
1.450
Suicide Attack?
0.005
0.036
1.004
0.117
Number of Perpetrator Fatalities 0.086
0.310
1.670
Hostages/Kidnapping?
-0.047*
0.022
0.954
0.066
Number of Perpetrators Injured
0.009
0.083
1.866
Number of Perpetrators
2.119
13.452
8.281
*
p <.001 ** p < .05 + p <.10
a Multi-level linear regression, controlling for region, ideology and decade. Coefficient for the PCA predictor variable is displayed.
b Multi-level logistic regression, controlling for region, ideology and decade. Coefficient for the PCA predictor variable is displayed.
ICC = Intraclass correlation coefficient

At the multivariate level, separate random-intercept multilevel models that
controlled for decade, region, and ideology were run for each of the outcome
variables (using a group mean centered version of the PCA scale) to account
for the direction of model predictions and the hierarchical nature of the data.
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Each multi-level model was tested for the inclusion of the regression
coefficient to verify if using a random-effects model was justified. When
controlling for region, ideology, and decade, the multi-level linear regression
results for the five higher-order variables available in Table 10 indicate that
none are significant at the multivariate level (p > .05), suggesting that PCA
scores are not related to the number of perpetrators involved in terrorist
events, nor with the number of victim and perpetrator fatalities and injuries.
Multi-level logistic regression models run for each of the dichotomous
variables (success, suicide, and hostages/kidnapping) that controlled for
region, ideology, and decade indicate that while all three variables are
significant at the bivariate level, only successful attack (b = 2.334, OR 1.014, p
< .001) and hostages/kidnapping (b = -0.047, OR = 0.954, p < .001) remain
significant at the multivariate level. The results indicate that terrorist events
with higher levels of the PCA had a slightly lesser likelihood of employing
hostage and kidnapping tactics, and a slightly greater likelihood of success.
Table 11: Multinomial logit model regression results – centered PCA scores predicting
outcome variables

b

SE

OR

Attack Type:a
(Reference: Bombing/Explosion)
Assassination
Armed Assault
Hostage Taking (Barricade)
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)
Facility/Infrastructure Attack
Other/Unknown

0.010*
0.015*
-0.021*
0.001
-0.009*
0.034*

0.015
0.001
0.005
0.002
0.002
0.003

1.010
1.015
0.979
1.001
0.991
1.034

Weapon Type:a
(Reference: Bombs/TNT)
Firearms
Incendiary
Melee
Other

0.011
-0.013
0.415**
0.020

0.007
0.014
0.016
0.014

1.011
0.987
1.042
1.020

*
a

b
Target Type:a
(Reference: Private Citizen)
Business
Government (General)
Police
Military
Airports and Airlines
Government (Diplomatic)
Educational Institutions
Journalists and Media
Other
Religious Figures / Locales
Telecommunication
Other Terrorist Groups
Non-Aviation Transport.
Unknown
Utilities

-0.021*
-0.000
0.001
-0.010**
0.007
0.018**
0.018*
-0.026*
0.009**
0.011**
-0.027*
-0.021**
-0.008*
-0.009
-0.030*

SE

OR

0.002
0.002
0.002
0.003
0.006
0.004
0.004
0.004
0.003
0.005
0.005
0.007
0.002
0.007
0.002

0.979
1.000
1.001
0.990
1.007
1.009
1.018
0.974
1.009
1.011
0.973
0.979
0.992
0.992
0.971

p <.001 ** p < .05 + p <.10
Multinominal logit, controlling for region, ideology and decade. Coefficient for the PCA predictor variable is displayed.

Results are available in Table 11 for two-level multinomial logit models that
were run for the three multi-categorical nominal variables (attack type,
target type and weapon type), controlling for region, ideology, and decade.
For attack type, using ‘bombing/explosions’ as the reference category,
assassination (b = 0.010, OR = 1.010, p < .001), armed assault (b= 0.015, OR
= 1.015, p < .001), hostage taking (barricade) (b = -0.021, OR = 0.979, p <
.001), facility/infrastructure attack (b = -0.009, OR = 0.991, p < .001), and
36
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 9, No. 2

other/unknown (b = 0.034, OR = 1.034, p < .001) are significant. This
suggests that terrorist events within the study sample with higher PCA scores
were more likely to use assassination, armed assault and ‘other’ attack types
(aside from the other categories listed) than bombs, and less likely to use
barricading and facility/infrastructure attacks than bombs. Using ‘private
citizens and property’ as the reference category for target type, businesses (b
= -0.021, OR = 0.979, p < .001), military (b = -0.010, OR = 0.990, p < .05),
diplomatic government targets (b = 0.018, OR = 1.009, p < .05), educational
institutions (b = 0.018, OR = 1.018, p < .001), journalists and media (b = 0.026, OR = 0.974, p < .001), other targets (b = 0.009, OR = 1.009, p < .05),
religious figures and locales (b = 0.011, OR = 1.011, p < .05),
telecommunication (b = -0.027, OR = 0.973, p < .001), other terrorist groups
(b = -0.021, OR = 0.979, p < .05), non-aviation transportation (b = -0.008,
OR = 0.992, p < .001), and utilities (b = -0.030, OR = 0.971, p < .001) are
significant. This indicates that terrorist events with higher PCA scores were
more likely to target private citizens and property than businesses, military,
journalists/media, telecommunication, other terrorist groups, non-aviation
transportation, and utilities, and were more likely to target diplomatic
government targets, ‘other’ targets than those listed, and religious
figures/locales than private citizens and property. Lastly, for weapon type,
higher levels of the PCA predicted a preference for melee weapons (b = 0.415,
OR = 1.042, p < .05) over bombs, explosives, or dynamite.

Discussion
This study was conducted to examine the relationship between differing levels
of charismatic authority and their strategic and operational choices within a
sample of terrorist organizations. Although more research is required before
any of the current findings can be treated as authoritative, the results reveal
several discernable operational trends. Findings at the bivariate level suggest
that terrorist groups with a higher magnitude of charismatic authority
committed more lethal attacks. However, this finding is not supported at the
multivariate level when controlling for region, decade, and ideology.
Multivariate findings on attack and weapon types indicate that the terrorist
groups within the sample with higher levels of charismatic authority were
more likely to employ melee weapons, use assassination tactics, engage in
armed assault, and use ‘other’ attack types, over bombs and explosives.
However, in regard to weapon choice, groups with higher levels of charismatic
authority were more likely to employ bombs and explosives over barricade
incidents and facility/infrastructure attacks. In terms of target preferences,
results indicate that groups with higher levels of charismatic authority were
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more likely to attack diplomatic targets, educational institutions, ‘other’
targets, and religious figures/locales than private citizens and property, but
were more likely to target private citizens and property rather than business,
military targets, journalists and media, telecommunications, other terrorist
groups, non-aviation transportation, and utilities. However, most of the
significant multivariate findings are limited in their predictive utility. The
likelihood of all of these relationships are relatively low (< 5%), which
suggests that they are not particularly helpful in authoritatively anticipating
the strategic behaviors of charismatically-led terrorist groups.
Despite the seminal nature of the current study, there are a number of
conclusions that may help inform future empirical analyses of charismatic
terrorist leadership. To begin, findings at both the bivariate and multivariate
levels indicate that highly-charismatic groups within the sample tended to be
more successful in their attacks. This suggests that the presence of strong
charismatic authority may have some form of operational or strategic benefit
to terrorist groups. The broader literature on leadership in both peaceful and
violent movements note that effective leadership is a crucial component to
organizational success.42 However, how charismatic leaders influence the
success or failure of terrorist attacks cannot be determined definitively with
the current data.
While speculative, one way in which charismatic terrorist leaders may
contribute to organizational success is by promoting group cohesion and selfidentification with the terrorist organization and its cause.43 This observation
is supported by study results that indicate a preference for “face-to-face”
weapon and attack types (e.g., assassination, armed assault, and melee
weapons) over the use of bombs and explosives within charismatically-led
terrorist groups. Research on interpersonal violence and conflict has shown
that people have an innate resistance to killing,44 although this can be broken

Bass, Bernard and Ruth Bass, The Bass Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research,
and Managerial Applications (New York: The Free Press, 2009), 11; Bernard Bass, Bruce
Avolio, Dong Jung, and Yair Berson, “Predicting Unit Performance by Assessing
Transformational and Transactional Leadership,” Journal of applied Psychology 88: 2
(2003): 209-209; Dawson, “The Study of New Religious Movements,” 14; McAdam,
Douglas, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 47.
43 See Boas Shamir, Michael Arthur, and Robert House, “The Rhetoric of Charismatic
Leadership: A Theoretical Extension, a Case Study, and Implications for Research,”
Leadership Quarterly 5: 1 (1994): 27-29.
44 Grossman, David, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and
Society (New York: Back Bay Books, 2009).
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down through conditioning or moral disengagement45 or the use of
impersonal weaponry such as guns and drone strikes.46 For the average
person, then, killing someone at close proximity or with his or her bare hands
requires a great deal of psychological conditioning and unwavering
commitment to a leader, group, or cause. The establishment of a strong
charismatic bond may strengthen both individual commitment and group
cohesion as followers conflate their needs and identity with that of the leader
and his or her cause.47 This, in turn, may help followers overcome social and
psychological barriers to close-hand interpersonal violence. This is perhaps
best exemplified by ISIS’s commonplace use of knives and swords to behead
those they deem to be infidels. The preference for hand-to-hand attack
methods therefore supports the idea that strong forms of charismatic
authority within the study sample may play an important role in catalysing
group cohesion and the intense socialization required to overcome the
aversion to kill. If this finding is substantiated in future research, it has the
potential to help inform the ongoing debate over the effectiveness of
leadership decapitation.
There are evident operational benefits for terrorist groups that function with
high levels of cohesion: A heightened sense of purpose, a strong support
system, resilience against outside infiltration, etc. But there are also
weaknesses. If charismatic terrorist leaders are indeed central to fostering
group cohesion and identity, leadership decapitation strategies may prove
more effective at disrupting these types of terrorist organizations.48 This may
also help explain why leadership decapitation is effective against some
groups, but not others.49 Needless to say, this supposition requires more
research in order to be treated as conclusive. However, given the importance
of highly-charismatic leaders to multiple aspects of their movements, it is
surprising that none of the literature for or against the effectiveness of

Albert Bandura, “The Role of Selection Moral Disengagement in Terrorism and
Counterterrorism,” in F.M. Moghaddam and A.J. Marsella (eds.), Understanding
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Terrorism,” 166.
47 Dawson, “Crises of Charismatic Legitimacy,” 84.
48 Cronin, Audrey K., How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of
Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 26; Weber, On
Charisma and Institution Building, 246-249.
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leadership decapitation strategies has adequately integrated the socialscientific concept of charismatic authority into their analyses.50
The appearance of success is a crucial component in charismatic leaders’
ability to maintain the charismatic bond with their followers. Since the basis
for their authority lies in the perceptions of their followers, charismatic
leaders must continually prove their legitimacy through successful
endeavours or risk losing their authority.51 It is therefore unsurprising that
charismatic groups within the sample were more likely to be successful, given
that the vast majority of the examined groups consist of long-lived terrorist
organizations. In other words, a certain measure of success was required for
the highly-charismatic groups within the sample to persist, or followers would
have abandoned the leaders’ causes. This, however, suggests that limiting
and minimizing opportunities for charismatically-led terrorist groups to claim
“successes” may be pivotal in delegitimizing their leadership by rendering
them impotent in the eyes of their followers.52 In particular, delegitimizing
charismatic leaders may have a significant role in hampering their ability to
radicalize potential members.
As the existing literature on terrorist radicalization indicates, the appearance
of legitimacy is an important factor in the ability of a leader to attract new
recruits.53 Simply killing or incarcerating a charismatic terrorist leader may
only serve to enhance or even routinize their charismatic authority by
entrenching them as symbols or martyrs to the cause.54 Similarly,
government responses that aim for swift apprehension of culprits and that
publically downplay the magnitude of terror attacks may be beneficial to
building resilience among civilians, but ignore the benefits accrued by
charismatic-leaders who are seen as capable of executing successful terrorist
attacks. Therefore, government responses to terrorism could benefit from
efforts to mitigate and control perceptions of success among terrorist groups
and their larger support networks. Detection and denial will always remain
Hofmann and Dawson, “The Neglected Role of Charismatic Authority,” 362.
Dawson, “Crises of Charismatic Legitimacy,” 94-98; Weber, On Charisma and
Institution Building, 22-23; Wilson, The Noble Savages, 29-31.
52 See Steven Hutchinson and Pat O’Malley, “How Terrorist Groups Decline,” ITAC:
Trends in Terrorism (2007): 8-9, available at: http://www.itac.gc.ca/pblctns/pdf/20071-eng.pdf.
53 Neumann, Peter R., Old & New Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity, 2009), 102; Richardson,
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Extremism in the West (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 25-26, 127, 147.
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93.
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the primary tools in preventing terrorist successes. However, if the
appearance of success is indeed a cornerstone in maintaining charismatic
authority within terrorist groups, then nuanced and carefully tested counterterrorism and media strategies that attack perceptions of success may have an
effect in hampering efforts to recruit new members and the ability of
charismatic leaders to maintain authority over their followers.
Study findings are also supportive of the existence of separate roles for
charismatic and operational leaders within terrorist groups. The limited
influence of charismatic authority on attack outcomes (e.g., the number of
perpetrators, fatalities, and wounded) and the limited predictive utility of the
findings on strategic choices may indicate that operational decisions within
terrorist groups are made separately from concerns involving charismatic
authority. In simpler terms, research results suggest that charismatic leaders
may be more concerned with maintaining their authority than worrying about
the small details involved in planning and executing terrorist attacks. In
social movement theory, this division of movement leadership has been
analyzed and substantiated with empirical case studies.55 In the particular
case of contentious social movements, two different types of leadership have
been identified: Task oriented (operational) leaders, who focus on assembling
resources and executing group action, and people-oriented (charismatic)
leaders, who focus on evoking and framing emotional responses within the
group.56 Interestingly, theorists note that conflict and imbalance between
task and people-oriented leaders is a significant factor in the failure of
contentious social movements.57 If a similar division in leadership roles is
common among terrorist groups, as hinted at by the current research
findings, then further empirical research aimed at differentiating the exact
roles and breadth of the influence of charismatic and operational terrorist
leaders is needed. This may lead to the identification of potential sources of
tension between operational and charismatic leaders that may help in crafting
non-coercive counter-terrorism initiatives aimed at delegitimizing terrorist
leadership or destabilizing larger terrorist networks.
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Study Limitations
Research results should be interpreted with a number of limitations in mind.
Study findings only begin to shed light on a small portion of the complex
realities involved in charismatic relationships within terrorist groups. Study
results cannot account for any meso or micro level social processes that may
influence the strategic and ideological direction of groups. The data available
in the GTD are insufficient for measuring group-level motivations,
relationships and social realities. This necessitates employing the PCA
indicators in qualitative research that can examine these group-level social
processes in more depth, or undertaking quantitative survey research among
active or incarcerated terrorists and radicals that inquires about charismatic
relationships.58
An additional study limitation is the inability to measure the influence of
multiple levels of leadership and authority on operational tactics and results
of attack incidents. Leadership manifests at many different levels within both
violent and non-violent social movements.59 This research focuses exclusively
upon charismatic organizational-level terrorist leaders–the top leaders–and
therefore fails to account for the effect of mid-level (e.g., lieutenants, network
brokers, seconds-in-command), cell-level, and grassroots leaders. F uture
research designs that can account for the effects of multiple levels of
leadership are needed to flesh out the full range of the influence of
charismatic authority in terrorist groups. With proper data, social network
analyses can be extremely beneficial in understanding the multi-level
complexity involved in the construction and maintenance of charismatic
authority and leadership within terrorist groups.
A number of study limitations are also the result of the coding process used to
determine the PCA scores for the study sample. Much like the GTD, the
coding process overwhelmingly relied on secondary source data. As a result,
coding was done from an “outsider” perspective, and was limited in its ability
to gain a truly deep understanding of the processes of charismatic authority
within the sample groups. The coding process was also hampered by barriers
involving language and access to information. This led to certain groups
being discarded entirely from the sample, which means that true probability
sampling is impossible. As a result, generalizability of research findings
See Schbley and McCauley, “Political, Religious, and Psychological Characteristics of
Muslim Protest Marchers in Eight European Cities,” 559-560.
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beyond the study sample is impossible. Lastly, since there was only a single
coder for the PCA scores for each group within the sample, there was
admittedly an element of subjectivity in the coding of the predictor variable.
Methods involving rigorous gathering and triangulation of data, along with
clearly outlined coding protocols that were consistently applied across each
group were employed to mitigate elements of subjective coding as much as
possible. However, despite efforts to limit elements of subjectivity during the
coding process, it is impossible to completely eliminate it from the analysis.
This limitation should be kept in mind when interpreting the results.
The unique security situation surrounding terrorism studies makes gaining
access to primary source data difficult at times. As a direct result, databases
like the GTD rely almost exclusively on secondary source data, which limits
information to the details known by the public. The inability to
comprehensively measure the “true” number and characteristics of terrorist
attacks can lead to unidentifiable statistical deformations that may cause
incorrect or incomplete findings. This problem is further exacerbated by the
study’s use of cross-sectional data to examine a dynamic phenomenon like
charismatic authority. Complex social phenomena like leadership and
authority are ever changing relationships that are renewed and recreated
through repeated interactions between leaders and followers. This raises an
issue with some of the longer-lived terrorist organizations in the sample,
whose ideology, actions, and leadership can change in a variety of different
ways throughout their life course. An inclusion criteria limiting attack
incidents to those that overlapped with the active time-period of the “major”
charismatic leader used for coding was originally considered during sampling,
but was ultimately decided against. A charismatic leader’s “presence” can be
routinized and persist after his or her death or incapacitation, much like how
Osama Bin Laden’s charisma persists in al-Qaeda inspired terrorism.
However, the fashion in which charismatic authority routinizes is not
universal across all terrorist groups, and the use of a cross-sectional predictor
variable in this study is admittedly problematic. Keeping this limitation in
mind, longitudinal statistical analyses of long-lived terrorist groups which
correlate strategic and behavioral trends with the rise and fall of charismatic
leaders across the organizational lifespan may prove to be useful to future
quantitative research on charismatic authority in terrorist groups.

Conclusion
The study of how charismatic forms of authority influence the strategic and
operational dynamics in terrorist groups is in its infancy, and many aspects of
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charismatic terrorist leadership remain unexamined or under-developed. For
example, how do mid or lower level leaders influence the strategic operation
of terrorist groups? Are there other forms of charismatic authority than those
examined in the study, such as the attribution and development of the
charismatic bond through the Internet and social media? How does
charismatic authority actively contribute to the radicalization and recruitment
of terrorists? Does the coercive removal of charismatic leaders have a greater
contribution to the disruption or dissolution of their groups? Is there an
effective way to delegitimize charismatic forms of leadership within terrorist
groups? Findings from the current study are promising, but only scratch the
surface of a highly complex social relationship. Knowledge of how
charismatic terrorist leaders recruit, radicalize, and manage their
organizations may prove to be pivotal in crafting effective counter-terrorism
strategies aimed at disrupting or dissolving these types of groups. But, this
will require much more empirical research that employs a variety of different
methodological approaches before we can gain a truly holistic understanding
of the nuances involved in the establishment, maintenance, and ultimate
demise of charismatic terrorist leadership.
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